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Regulatory policy in telecommunications is desperately in need of mid-level theory.  
There is widespread consensus that regulators should try to promote competition.  There 
is also bitter contention about what this implies for particular industry battles.  For 
example, an industry observer declared, “Competition should be the policy.  And code 
that enables competition should be the rule.”2  He then went on to argue that the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) should require AT&T to allow customers to choose 
the Internet service provider that provides service over AT&T’s cable facilities.  This 
reach to a policy action, without support from an analysis of the merits of different 
structural possibilities for competition, makes competition into merely a rhetorical 
device.  In considering whether to mandate sub-loop unbundling, to require line-sharing, 
or to allow the use of unbundled network elements for the provision of leased lines, the 
issue is not just the costs of more aggressively promoting competition; such decisions 
also have profound implications for industry structure. 
 
Regulators must make strategic choices among different structural possibilities for 
competition.3  The common view that deregulation should occur once competition has 
developed is not a good framework for policy. Unlike antitrust policy, which acts to 
                                                 
1 The opinions and conclusions expressed in this paper are those of the author.  They do not necessarily 
reflect the views of the Federal Communications Commission, its Commissioners, or any staff other than 
the author.  I am grateful for numerous colleagues, at the FCC and in the global telecom policy community, 
who have shared their insights and experience with me. 
2 Lessig, Lawrence, “Cable Blackmail”, The Standard, Nov. 14, 1999, on the web at 
www.thestandard.com/article/display/0,1151,5198,00.html. 
3 In considering the scope for strategic choice, there is an unfortunate tendency to gravitate toward poles of 
self-glorification (“we are, vis-à-vis the laws of nature in this new space, gods” [Lessig]) or of self-
abnegation (“abolish the FCC” [Huber]).  See Lessig, Lawrence, “Reading the Constitution in Cyberspace,” 
45 Emory Law Journal 3(1996) p. 7.  Huber, Peter, Law and Disorder in Cyberspace: Abolish the FCC and 
Let Common Law Rule the Telecosm (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), passim.  For an 
insightful analysis of Huber’s book, see Bell, Tom W., “The Common Law in Cyberspace” 97 Michigan 
Law Review (1999). 
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restore suppressed competition, pro-competitive regulation in a historically monopolized 
industry has to assess the merits of promoting new, different, and often incompatible 
dimensions of competition.4  Waiting for competition to emerge before deregulating 
fosters the illusion that the existing structure of regulation does not shape the competition 
that develops.  Of course it does, and the way that regulation shapes competition should 
be a key consideration in regulatory decisions.   Regulators, while staying alert, humble, 
and flexible, need to think about this question: What are the most beneficial changes in 
industry structure that feasible regulatory policies could promote?  
 
This paper attempts to expand discussion of this question.   It puts forward three 
propositions: 
 
1. Structural problems are constraining beneficial developments for Internet 
services and voice telephony.   
 
With respect to Internet services, the challenges of defining meaningful products and 
establishing value-based interconnection relationships are slowing the development of 
new services requiring different billing protocols, qualities of service, and reliability.  
With respect to voice telephony, pro-competitive regulation that does not adequately 
consider the costs and benefits of promoting different forms of competition may 
perpetuate costly, complex regulatory battles and limit the scope for commercially driven 
business re-organization and service innovation. 
 
2. Development of competing, independently owned service interconnection points 
(SIPs) will stimulate development of local facilities and wide-area services.   
 
Connecting end users to a telecommunications network depends heavily on idiosyncratic, 
location-specific knowledge and equipment.  In contrast, providing network services is 
inherently a non-local business relying on standardized routines and equipment.  
Businesses that I will refer to as service interconnection points (SIPs) would enable the 
separation of these two different spheres of activity and thus stimulate more dynamic, 
decentralized industry growth. 
 
3.  Regulation of voice service interconnection should promote competing, 
independently owned SIPs.   
 
Existing regulatory authority and practice largely shape interconnection for voice 
telephony.  While data traffic is growing much more rapidly than voice traffic, the value 
and bandwidth of voice traffic is still sufficient to influence strongly the over-all structure 
of network interconnection.  Regulation should promote competing, independently 
owned SIPs by giving them the opportunity to have a privileged position for terminating 
voice calls.   
  
                                                 
4 The goal of regulation in a formerly monopolized industry is not just to restrain the monopoly power of 
the incumbent.  Cf. Lessig, “Cable Blackmail.” 
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Taken together, these propositions suggest that feasible changes in the regulation of voice 
telephony interconnection could help to create a better competitive structure for the 
industry.  Regulation thus far had tended to treat telephony interconnection architecture 
merely from the perspective of technical feasibility and particular competitors’ requests. 
Moreover, telephony interconnection regulations have often been defined in terms of the 
incumbent operator’s facilities and offices.5  Given the enduring economic importance of 
interconnection architecture, a broader perspective should be considered.6  The 
development of competing, independently owned SIPs would provide an industry 
structure conducive to better regulatory policy and more dynamic, decentralized industry 
growth. 
 
 
I.  Structural limitations to the Internet 
 
A worrisome aspect of the current structure of Internet services is that retail customers 
often have little idea of what they are actually buying.  A classic topic on Internet 
discussion lists might be stylized as: “I bought a T1 to the Internet.  How do I make sure 
that I’m getting a full T1 to the whole Internet?”   When buying leased lines, customers 
buy dedicated bandwidth between two specified points.  Leased lines are well-defined, 
established products, but they have low average bandwidth utilization and high network 
management costs.  When a customer purchases a T1 from an Internet service provider, 
the customer typically gets a “T1’s worth” of dedicated bandwidth from the customer to 
the Internet service provider.  But that connection is not in itself something that the 
customer values; the customer wants particular services with particular quality, 
reliability, and billing features. 
 
A. Quality of service, reliability, billing: transactional, not technical challenges 
 
Internet service providers currently face large challenges in attempting to provide their 
customers infrastructure-based service differentiation such as quality of service, 
                                                 
5 In the U.S., the Telecommunications Act of 1996 required incumbent local exchange carriers (incumbent 
LECs) to provide interconnection at any technically feasible point within their networks. Communications 
Act, amended, Section 251(c)(2)(B).   To implement other requirements of the Act, the FCC has required 
incumbent LEC interconnection and network elements to be priced based on the forward-looking cost of 
the most efficient current network technology deployed within the structure of the incumbent LEC’s wire 
centers (offices).  Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 
1996, First Report and Order, CC Docket 96-98 (released Aug. 8, 1996), para. 683-685.  This approach, 
known as the FCC’s TELRIC rules, makes interconnection rates and network elements prices dependent on 
the incumbent LEC’s geographic structure of wire centers.   The Commission of the European 
Communities has recommended maximum prices for local, single transit, and double transit 
interconnection, i.e. interconnection defined in terms of the hierarchy of the particular company’s 
telephony network.  See 98/195/EC: Commission Recommendation of 8 January 1998 on interconnection 
in a liberalised telecommunications market (Official Journal L 228, 15/08/1998 p. 0030-0034).  
6 The Peruvian regulator, OSIPTEL, has required the incumbent Peruvian operator, Telefonica del Peru, to 
provide at least one interconnection point in each of Peru’s 24 departments.  Thus OSIPTEL has made a 
choice about the geographic structure, but not the ownership structure or competitive structure, of 
interconnection points with Telefonica.   See Legislacion en Telecomunicaciones, Decreto Supremo No 
020-98-MTC para. 39 (available on the web at www.osiptel.gob.pe/marleg/cont/leg/leg/1998/ds20-98-
mtc.htm). 
 4
reliability, and billing options.  The unstructured and dynamic nature of interconnection 
on the Internet makes establishing new types of infrastructure-based services difficult.  
The long and tortuous discussions about “upgrading the Internet” from IPv4 to IPv6 
illustrate the nature of the challenges.  Lower profile examples of infrastructure 
development problems include small but annoying and persisting incompatibilities in e-
mail formats, the handling of extended ASCII characters, and the treatment of e-mail 
attachments.  Customers who, for a variety of reasons, need services not available using 
current, generic Internet connectivity can establish a variety of different forms of service 
level agreements, virtual private networks, customized peering arrangements, etc.  
Making such arrangements involves high transaction costs.  That is a major weakness in 
the current structure of the Internet services industry. 
 
Looking at the wholesale level (transactions between Internet service providers), some 
industry observers and participants have voiced concern that prevailing peering 
(interconnection) practices impede the Internet’s development.   One respected industry 
figure noted in early 1998, “. . .the extant non-policy peering policy [is] the biggest threat 
to the future of a competitive Internet.”7  A recent article in a leading trade publication 
declared: 
Contrary to popular belief, the biggest impediment to a better, faster Internet isn’t 
technological.  It’s political.  The Internet is composed of about 8,000 smaller 
networks, and there are no rules (or laws) defining how they’re connected.  As a 
result, ISPs engage in lengthy, closed-door debates trying to determine how to 
connect, who should pay more, and how upgrades will be handled.8   
Lack of mutual understanding and acceptance of peering terms has led to disputes about 
traffic routing, traffic balances, and arrangements for international interconnection.9 
 
These peering disputes point to the problem of trying to allocate service value rationally 
among networks interconnected without any established service structure.  Suppose that 
network 1 has many customers that it charges for Internet access and network 2 hosts 
several servers that provide information over the Internet.   Network 1 passes server 
queries to network 2, and network 2 returns the requested data to network 1.   What do 
these two networks owe each other for network services?  Network 2 sends many more 
packets into network 1 than it receives, so perhaps network 2 owes network 1 money for 
interconnection services.  On the other hand, network 1’s customers, who pay for Internet 
service only to network 1, requested the information from network 2, so perhaps network 
1 should pay for receiving the information from network 2.  Note also that the content 
providers who hire network 2 to host their content may have advertisers who want 
network 1’s subscribers to see their advertisements, and they may also be collecting, from 
network 1’s access customers, subscription fees for the content that they offer.  Even this 
simplified market structure provides little guidance as to how to divide rationally service 
                                                 
7 Rickard, Jack, “Editor’s Notes,” Boardwatch , May 1998 (on the web at 
boardwatch.internet.com/mag/98/may/bwm1.html, p. 6). 
8 Gareiss, Robin, “Tech Tutorial, Old Boys’ Network,” Data Communications, October 7, 1999. 
9 For a good discussion of Internet interconnection, see Huston, Geoff, “Interconnection, Peering and 
Settlements,” available at http://www.isoc.org/inet99/proceedings/1e/1e_1.htm. 
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value between networks.  Commercial negotiations over these issues are, not surprisingly, 
contentious.  
 
Two additional facts further confound attempts to allocate interconnection service value 
in an economically rational way.  First, a particular service for a customer on one 
network may involve network traffic traversing two or more other networks, and the 
networks involved can change rapidly in response to changes in overall traffic patterns.  
Thus, for a particular service provided over the Internet, the networks that participate in 
supplying the service are not pre-defined.  Second, the Internet is a platform for the 
provision of a wide variety of services, while interconnection between networks is 
typically not negotiated on a service-specific basis but instead assessed in terms of packet 
transport.  The simple form that peering agreements currently take constrains transaction 
costs within an industry structure that offers meager guidance for allocating 
interconnection service value rationally.  Such agreements, however, further obscure the 
economic signals relevant to  interconnection service value. 
 
The problem that Internet service providers have in defining differentiated infrastructure 
services for their retail customers is directly related to the problem of allocating 
interconnection service value rationally.  From a supply perspective, the poorly 
developed and differentiated market for interconnection services constrains the 
development of retail products that use interconnection services as inputs.  From a 
demand perspective, the economic transactions that define the current Internet industry 
structure generate only highly attenuated transmission of consumer value to agents 
making relevant network investment decisions.  This industry structure provides a strong 
impetus to consolidation: services provided end-to-end within one company’s network 
face none of the transactional challenges outlined above.  
 
Moreover, without structural change in the Internet, small ISPs will make a much less 
beneficial contribution to the industry.   An industry structure that gives small ISPs no 
opportunities to preserve and develop their businesses other than continually bargaining 
with a few large network operators will foster neither a dynamic industry nor 
decentralized innovation.  Instead, small ISPs are likely to struggle to ensure their 
survival through political means.  For insight into how this can occur, consider the 
position of the approximately 1400 small, independent local telephone companies in the 
U.S.  These companies have effectively organized themselves through associations such 
as the National Exchange Carriers Association (NECA), the National Telephone 
Cooperative Association (NTCA), and the Organization for the Preservation and 
Advancement of Small Telephone Companies (OPASTCO).  As it turns out, Sections 
3(37)(B) and (C) of the U.S. Telecommunications Act include under the definition of 
rural telephone company all sufficiently small local telephone companies, irrespective of 
where they are located.  Under the Act and associated FCC regulations, rural telephone 
companies are extended special regulatory and universal service benefits.     
 
B. Public policy for Internet infrastructure: “don’t change anything” 
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Public policy for Internet infrastructure has not responded to these increasingly serious 
industry challenges.  The U.S. regulatory framework for Internet infrastructure was 
established fifteen to twenty years ago.  The governing principle for Internet regulation is 
“don’t change anything”. An FCC order in 1980 decided that enhanced services are not 
subject to common carrier regulation.10 Internet services have been classified as enhanced 
services, and hence they have not been subject to the many regulations that govern 
interconnection for voice telephony.  Moreover, based on a 1983 FCC decision, enhanced 
service providers are treated as end users.11  Thus Internet service providers can purchase 
flat-rated end-user offerings from local telephony companies and avoid a separate set of 
regulated prices, including per minute charges, that local telephony companies apply to 
switched voice telephony customers who are classified as “telecommunications carriers”.   
 
As argued above, the challenges associated with defining meaningful products and value-
based interconnection relationships appear to be constraining the Internet from 
developing even more impressively than it is now.  However, attempts to address these 
issues directly have not been successful.  Consider, for example, the fate of the following 
significant initiative.  In the summer of 1999, Reed Hundt, former Chairman of the FCC, 
attempted to set up an industry forum to address Internet interconnection. The forum’s 
goal was described in the trade press as follows: “to stave off potential government 
regulation of peering by determining how large Internet service providers can fairly 
interconnect their networks with smaller counterparts.” 12  The forum intended to address  
“financial settlements for interconnection and whether different charges should apply for 
different types of traffic.”13   
 
Several months later, a leading trade publication reported: 
“What I’m finding everywhere is indecision,” he [Hundt] says.  “There’s a lot of 
interest, but no consensus.”  And that inability to find common ground is what 
concerns him.  His original view was that peering would be settled in one of three 
ways: by a forum, market forces, or regulation.  Now that the forum route seems 
not to be working, Hundt fears that regulators might step in.14 
More than a year earlier, another leading trade publication noted, “Talk of any type of 
government intervention, from the Justice Department or the Federal Communications 
Commission, scares everyone in the game.”15  One might imagine that having a former 
Chairman of the FCC discuss these issues would heighten concerns.  The failure of this 
effort and others16 to make progress suggests the great difficulty of trying to resolve 
Internet interconnection issues directly given current industry structure.  
 
                                                 
10 In the Matter of Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission’s Rules and Regulations (Second 
Computer Inquiry), 77 FCC 2d 384, 419 (1980) (Computer II Final Decision). 
11 MTS and WATS Market Structure, 97 FCC 2d 682, 711-22 (1983). 
12 “Hundt to Set Up Peering Forum”, Data Communications (June 1999), on the web at 
http://www.data.com/story/DCM19990610S0001. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Gareiss, Robin, “Tech Tutorial, Old Boys’ Network”, Data Communications (October 7, 1999).  
15 McCarthy, Bill, “ISPs Agree on Little, But They Don’t Want the Government to Choose Their Peers,” 
Miscellaneous in Boardwatch  (May 1998). 
16  See, for example, “Brokered Private Peering (BPP)tm Group”, Miscellaneous, Boardwatch (May 1998). 
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II.  Telephony regulation: promoting competition without judgement 
 
Policy makers around the world, of many different political persuasions, now regularly 
proclaim their determination to promote competition in telecommunications.  Adding 
substance to this determination requires addressing the following question: “For what 
should competition be promoted?”  Promoting competition for particular services can 
have major implications for the evolution of regulation and the long-term competitive 
structure of the industry.   Unfortunately, the “competition for what?” question has not 
received adequate consideration.  This policy deficiency may have significant long-run 
costs: current voice telephony regulation may be unintentionally promoting an industry 
structure for competition that is much less beneficial than alternatives. 
 
A. Avoiding judgements about competitive structure 
 
Despite the enactment of a broad range of pro-competitive policies in 
telecommunications, policy analysts and policy makers are reluctant to confront directly 
the question of competitive structure.  Instead, policy makers are assumed to be 
responsible for promoting competition for everything, everywhere.   Seldom today is 
there any consideration of whether this is feasible or desirable, although regulators are 
also generally expected to pledge to protect consumers from any unfortunate effects of all 
this competition.17  “Competitive neutrality” is also considered to be a key policy 
concept.  It appears to mean that the regulator, while promoting competition for 
everything, will ensure that regulation doesn’t promote one type of competition more 
than another.    Such rhetoric, while incoherent, emphasizes that regulatory 
considerations of competitive structure are preparations for exercising regulatory 
discretion.   Regulatory discretion is considered an undesirable and unnecessary aspect of 
sound pro-competitive policy. 
 
1. Failure of the technocratic approach 
 
In traditional neo-classical economics and public utility theory, analyses of technology 
and demand provided the analytical basis for judgements about competitive structure. 
The key phrase in this approach is “natural monopoly”.   Based on estimates of the 
characteristics of production functions and consumer demand, the industry is partitioned 
into markets, and the markets are classified as either “workably competitive” or  
“naturally monopolistic”.  Regulators promote competition in markets that are “workably 
competitive” and continue to regulate markets that are “ naturally monopolistic”.18 
 
                                                 
17 For some analysis of whether more competition in U.S. long distance services is an appropriate policy 
goal, see Galbi, Douglas, “the price of telecom competition: counting the cost of advertising and 
promotion,” info vol 1, no. 2 (april 1999) pp. 133-193, and Galbi, Douglas, “Regulating Prices for Shifting 
Between Service Providers,” currently available through the Social Science Research Network 
(www.ssrn.com), forthcoming in Information Economics and Policy. 
18 Tim Brennan provided me with comments that have formed the substance of this paragraph. 
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Unfortunately, the technocratic approach provides limited guidance for pro-competitive 
policy in the telecommunications industry of today.  When telephony was a radically 
different business from cable service, when switching cost weren’t driven by 
developments in the computer industry, and when wireless telephony and the Internet 
didn’t exist, economists could and did analyze whether particular parts of the telephone 
network were a natural monopoly.  Today’s much more dynamic technological and 
demand context make such analysis much more difficult.  
 
More significantly, this technocratic approach obscures issues that should be central 
policy considerations.  First, the effects of regulation on the structure of competition 
should be a key regulatory concern.  Interconnection regulation, for example, might be 
able to mitigate economies of scope that would otherwise preserve a “natural monopoly”.  
More generally, the classification of “workably competitive” markets cannot be prior to 
consideration of regulation, which is no less natural than markets.  Second, time should 
be a key regulatory concern.  Facilities-based broadband connectivity to residences, for 
example, might develop into a “workably competitive” market over a time span that is 
too long to deliver benefits comparable to a loop unbundling requirement imposed on the 
incumbent telephony provider. 
 
The technocratic approach largely fails to inform current telecommunications policy.  A 
determination to promote competition everywhere in the telecommunications industry 
might be taken to imply the judgement that there are no natural monopolies in the 
industry.  But policy makers have not made that judgement.  Policy makers now 
generally ignore the technocratic approach to making judgements about competitive 
structure, not because of its weaknesses, but because they now largely attempt to avoid 
making judgements about competitive structure. 
 
2. Focus on incumbent monopolists’ products and networks 
 
One way in which pro-competitive policy attempts to avoid making judgements about 
competitive structure is by assuming that the incumbent monopolists’ products and 
network elements define the relevant competitive possibilities.   Crude forms of this 
perspective include the view that competition will lower prices but will not change 
anything else, or that emerging wireless communications services will evolve to be like 
the services that wireline local exchange carriers provide.19   More sophisticated 
examples of this policy perspective include the FCC’s attempt to establish competition 
for switched voice transport to incumbent end-offices.20  More recent policies focusing 
on more extensive forms of unbundling of the incumbents’ networks implicitly tend to 
sanction the view that competition, if it develops, will develop for elements of the 
incumbents’ networks.  One sees a slightly twisted version of this perspective in a recent 
                                                 
19 For a critique of the latter view, see Charles D. Cosson, “You Say You Want A Revolution? Fact and 
Fiction Regarding Broadband CMRS and Local Competition,” CommLaw Conspectus 7:2 (Summer 1999) 
pp. 223-278. 
20 A detailed description and analysis of this policy was part of an earlier draft of this paper, available on 
request from the author. 
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paper that implicitly proposes that unbundling should not be imposed to enable 
competitors to provide products that the incumbent operator does not provide.21 
 
3. The rise of the client-driven approach 
 
Another way regulators avoid making judgements about competitive structure is by 
taking a client-driven approach to pro-competitive regulatory policy.  This approach 
works as follows.  Company B argues that the regulator must require Company A to do X 
so that Company B can provide service Y.  Typically Company A is described as a 
monopolist and X is described as essential for providing Y.  Moreover, Y is described as 
a service that many customers want, because it will be better or lower priced than the 
alternative.  The regulator promotes competition by requiring Company A to do X.  The 
regulator does not require Company B to actually provide Y, nor does the regulator 
require Company B to provide Y better or lower-priced than the identified alternative; 
such requirements would be considered intrusive regulation.   What sorts of competition 
are promoted thus depend on companies’ requests, the regulator’s responsiveness to 
them, and what companies actually do with the regulatory rights that they gain. 
 
The U.S. Telecommunications Act of 1996 supports this approach, but it does not require 
it.   Section 251(c)(3) of the Act identifies duties of incumbent local exchange carriers to 
provide access to network elements in response to requests from telecommunications 
carriers seeking to provide telecommunications services.  Section 251(d)(2) gives the 
FCC the responsibility for defining the scope of these duties.  Under Section 
251(d)(2)(B), an “impair” limitation on access duties is set out in the context of a 
telecommunications carrier “seeking access to provide the services that it seeks to offer”.  
However, the “necessary” limitation on access duties in Section 251(d)(2)(A) is not put in 
this context.  One might imagine a form of access that is necessary to provide a 
telecommunications service that a telecommunications carrier seeks to offer, but that is 
not necessary to promote a pro-competitive, deregulatory strategy for the industry.  
Moreover, Section 251(d)(2) sets out minimum access standards that the FCC must 
consider.   Additional access standards associated with a broader vision for pro-
competitive, deregulatory industry development appear to be permissible, but they have 
not been explored. 
 
 
B. Unintentional aspects of emerging industry structure 
 
Although policy makers have been pre-occupied with the extent of competition and its 
speed of development, industry performance also depends on other aspects of competitive 
structure.  Even in a communications industry in which all product markets are workably 
competitive, at least two sorts of potential weaknesses could exist.  First, the industry, 
although competitive, might not be capable of re-organizing itself quickly to adjust to 
changes in technology or the scope of potential trades.  Second, the industry, although 
                                                 
21 See condition (5) in the unbundling standard proposed in Jerry A. Hausman and J. Gregory Sidak, “A 
Consumer-Welfare Approach to the Mandatory Unbundling of Telecommunications Networks,” The Yale 
Law Journal, vol. 109 pp. 418-505. 
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competitive, might dissipate significant economic value as companies continually appeal 
to the regulator to decide narrow, complex issues concerning the distribution of value 
between companies.   Aspects of pro-competitive regulatory policies for voice telephony 
may be contributing to the development of such weaknesses. 
 
Current pro-competitive regulatory policies for voice telephony are increasing the cost of 
adjusting a geographic structure of incumbent end offices that is probably highly 
inefficient.  The geographic structure of incumbent telephone operators’ end offices was 
largely established prior to 1917.  Given subsequent dramatic developments in switching 
and transport technology, this structure is likely to be highly inefficient. Pro-competitive 
regulation, however, is now deeply connected to the existing structure of incumbents’ 
networks.  Such regulations have partitioned incumbents’ networks into elements defined 
in terms of incumbents’ existing end-offices.  Regulated rates for interconnection have 
been defined in terms of tandem and end-office hierarchies.  Competitors have granted 
regulatory rights to collocate in incumbent end offices.  Given such regulations, changes 
in the structure of incumbents’ network are likely to occur much more slowly. 
 
Moreover, collocation rules have created narrow, complex, and enduring regulatory 
battles between companies. State regulatory commissions in the U.S. began to require 
collocation in incumbents’ offices as early as 1989.22  The FCC began to establish 
national collocation rules in 1992.23  Yet companies are still battling intensely over 
narrow issues that affect the value of collocation obligations.  For example, a 1999 FCC 
order decided, among other issues, that collocating carriers are allowed to construct their 
own facilities for cross-connecting among themselves, that incumbent LECs must 
provide “shared collocation”, “cageless collocation”, and collocation in adjacent 
controlled environments if collocation space is exhausted.24  The FCC also decided: 
. . .an incumbent LEC that denies collocation of a competitor’s equipment, citing 
safety concerns, must provide to the competitive LEC within five business days a 
list of all equipment that the incumbent LEC locates within the premises in 
question, together with an affidavit attesting that all of that equipment meets or 
exceeds the safety standard that the incumbent LEC contends the competitor’s 
equipment fails to meet.25   
A large number of other issues, at this level of detail, are emerging with respect to loop-
sharing, managing interference among loops (“cross talk”), sub-loop unbundling, and the 
use of various combinations of wholesale network services or elements.   
 
                                                 
22 The New York Public Service Commission (NY PSC) required virtual collocation for private line service 
in 1989, and physical collocation for switched services in 1992.  For more details and citations to NY PSC 
orders, see Application by Bell Atlantic New York for Authorization Under Section 271 of the 
Communications Act to Provide In-Region, InterLATA Service in the State of New York, FCC 
Memorandum Opinion and Order, CC Docket 99-295, FCC 99-404 (rel. Dec. 22, 1999). 
23 Initially, the FCC required physical collocation.  This requirement was overturned in court, so the FCC 
enacted a virtual collocation requirement.  The Telecommunications Act of 1996 give the FCC authority to 
require physical collocation. 
24 Deployment of Wireline Service Offering Advanced Telecommunications Capability, 144 FCC Rd 4761, 
CC Docket 98-147 (rel. Mar. 31, 1999). 
25 Ibid para. 36. 
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Attempts to implement unbundled access to the incumbents’ network have quickly led to 
the recognition that information systems for pre-ordering, ordering, provisioning, repair, 
maintenance, and billing (OSS) determine the usefulness of physical facilities.   
Regulators are thus forced to confront complicated issues associated with information 
systems’ capabilities and performance.  To get a sense for the nature of some of the 
regulatory fights between parties, consider that parties expressed concern, and the FCC 
noted concern, that competing carriers using Bell South’s network must scroll through 
lists of products and services to fulfill particular customer orders.  In contrast, Bell 
South’s own retail interface allows its customer service representatives to find a product 
or service simply by typing the first few letters of the product’s name.26   A recent 
independent test of Bell Atlantic’s OSS in New York State, done for regulatory purposes, 
involved statistics for 855 test elements.27  Such tests merely establish performance.  
Fertile opportunities still exist for disputing blame in a process somewhat similar to 
trying to figure out why your operating system crashed when you tried to run a particular 
feature of a particular application program. 
 
Detailed regulations and adjudications related to network operators’ information systems 
are likely to have high welfare costs.  Technology is rapidly driving down the cost of 
switching and transport hardware.28  The most important challenge in improving industry 
performance is not to promote the more efficient deployment of network hardware.  It is 
to foster a wider range of network management capabilities and to promote quicker, more 
customized service.29   Regulations that require an incumbent network operator to 
provide to competitors non-discriminatory access to its OSS greatly diminish the 
incumbent’s incentives to improve its OSS.30  Subjecting the performance of such 
systems to an adversarial process also makes change more risky and more difficult. 
 
In regulated industries, companies and customers tend to acquire quasi-property rights in 
existing arrangements.  As companies and customers make plans and investments based 
on the wide range of regulatory rights being established for telephony, the possibilities 
                                                 
26 Application of BellSouth Corporation, et. al. Pursuant to Section 271 of the Communications Act of 
1934, as amended, To Provide In-Region, InterLATA Services in South Carolina, 13 FCC  Rcd 539, CC 
Docket 97-208 (rel. Dec. 24, 1997), para. 174. 
27 Bell Atlantic  NY 271 Application, Introduction and Summary. 
28 In 1998,software accounted for 40% of capital spending for MCI WorldCom, with switching and 
transport accounted for 6% and 19% respectively.  In contrast, in 1988 software accounted for 3% of MCI’s 
capital spending, while switching and transported accounted for 19% and 44% respectively.  MCI 
WorldCom expects that switching and transport will amount to less than 25% of capital spending per year 
within a few years.  John Sidgmore, MCI WorldCom Vice Chairman, presentation to stock analysts, Spring 
1999. 
29 In 1998, MCI WorldCom’s cost for delivering one minute of voice traffic broke down as follows: OSS, 
5%; switching, 3%; transport, 4%; operating costs, 26%; access (interconnection fees), 62%. John 
Sidgmore, MCI WorldCom Vice Chairman, presentation to stock analysts, Spring 1999. 
30 Under the Section 271 requirements of the U.S. Telecommunications Act, as implemented by the FCC, 
“For OSS functions that are analogous to those that a BOC provides to itself, its customers, or its affiliates, 
the nondiscrimination standard requires the BOC to offer requesting carriers access that is equivalent in 
terms of quality, accuracy, and timeliness.  The BOC must provide access that permits competing carriers 
to perform these functions in “substantially the same time and manner” as the BOC.   Application by Bell 
Atlantic-NY for Authorization Under Section 271, CC Docket 99-295, para. 85.  Such regulation lessens the 
competitive value to the RBOC of investing to improve its OSS.   
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for future regulatory dis-engagement narrow, and the regulator may be required to police 
continually the value of acquired rights.  One might hope that emerging market 
opportunities would gradually erode the value of rights acquired under telephony 
regulation.  For example, suppose that under telephony regulations a company has won 
the right to do “x” for price “p1”.  If competitive industry development results in “x” 
being freely offered for price p2<p1, then regulatory rights will be liquidated in a 
decentralized way.  Regulatory rights will also be liquidated if a more cost effective 
opportunity than “x” emerges, or if for some other reason “x” is no longer a useful right. 
 
The liquidation of regulatory rights is not, however, a result that will follow inevitably 
from industry growth and the development of competition.  For example, if incumbent 
LECs’ end offices become key network interconnection points, then collocation rights 
may endure long beyond the growth of competitive telecommunications networks.  
Regulated rights associated with complex information systems like OSS are likely to be 
difficult to liquidate because of idiosyncratic investments that companies will have to 
make to establish compatible software and necessary business routines.  Policy makers 
and industry participants who look forward to the growth of competition and deregulation 
need to consider the possible significance of what economists call “hysteresis” or “lock-
in” effects.  One can easily image the rapid growth of “grandfather” clauses that 
perpetuate the effects of legacy regulations long beyond the relevance of the policy 
concerns that motivated them.  Competition will occur, but in the context of regulations 
that hinder industry change and foster wasteful regulatory battles. 
  
 
 III. Making Judgements about Propitious Industry Structure 
 
While there are many good reasons for encouraging humility in policy analysts and 
policy makers, careful analysis and industry observation can provide a basis for making 
useful judgements about industry structure.  The intention is not to forecast the future, 
even less to provide a comprehensive development plan for the industry.  The objective is 
to identify key economic distinctions that appear to be relatively stable, explore their 
implications for beneficial industry development, and look for nascent industry trends 
that may be provide a foundation for promoting such development.  
 
A. Economic Analysis 
 
Connecting end users to a telecommunications network is a local business.31  
Constructing these connections requires careful consideration of local topology and 
economic geography. Constructing these connections also requires careful consideration 
of local regulations and politics; wireline network operators need to secure extensive 
right-of-ways from local governments, and wireless operators need to place antennae.  
Moreover, in the U.S. in 1990, approximately 28% of all housing units were multiple 
                                                 
31 George Ford, formerly of the Competition Division of the FCC’s Office of General Counsel and now at 
MCI WorldCom, has emphasized this point to me in discussions of industry economics. 
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dwelling units, and the share of such units is significantly higher in other countries.32  To 
gain access to end users, network operators often have to enter into highly location-
specific, idiosyncratic negotiations with the owners of buildings, campuses, and managed 
housing tracts.  National regulation can play a role in addressing these challenging issues, 
and the FCC has been actively considering a variety of questions and regulations.33  
Nonetheless, no national regulations are likely to be able to transform end-user 
connections into a standardized, nationally negotiated and managed service. 
 
In contrast, providing network services is inherently a non-local business relying on 
standardized routines and infrastructure capabilities.  The ubiquity of e-mail services 
depends on addressing, routing, and formatting standards.  Requesting and serving web 
pages requires additional widely implemented standards.  The nature of such standards is 
largely independent of local knowledge and infrastructure, and the service provided is not 
related to any geographical location.  Customers do not necessarily care where 
Amazon.com’s servers are physically located.  For products that it can deliver in 
electronic form, Amazon.com does not necessarily care where its customers are 
physically located.34  Moreover, Amazon.com can expand its capacity to deliver 
electronic products to customers simply by installing additional standardized hardware.35  
Stock market valuations for companies such as Amazon.com have soared largely because 
their business models readily scale to global commerce. 
 
Dividing customer value between local connectivity and wide-area network services is a 
fundamental economic problem.  While no amount of head-scratching and eye-gouging 
can resolve this issue, industry performance will depend heavily on the quality of the 
arrangements that are worked out.  The most important resource for working out such 
arrangements is relevant information.  The best way to generate such information is have 
customers choose among different combinations of local connectivity and wide-area 
network services. 
 
B. Institutional Implications 
 
The above economic analysis suggest that good industry performance is likely to depend 
on the presence of businesses that provide effective separation of local connectivity from 
wide-area network services.  I will refer to businesses that serve this function as service 
interconnection points or SIPs.  SIPs would compete locally in coordinating wide-area 
network services for local end users.  A SIP would lease local facilities providing 
connectivity to end users and would host and interconnect to facilities distributing wide-
area network services.  To mediate effectively between local connectivity and wide-area 
network services, within the relevant geography a SIP should not be owned by either a 
local facilities provider or wide-area network service provider.  This allows a local 
                                                 
32 Promotion of Competitive Networks in Local Telecommunications Markets, FCC WT Docket 99-217,  
CC Docket 96-98 (rel. July 7, 1999) para. 29.  
33 Ibid.  See also Telecommunications Inside Wiring, FCC CS Docket 95-184 (rel. Oct. 17, 1997). 
34 A supporting electronic payment infrastructure, such as that for credit cards, is also necessary. 
35 To the extent that customer support requires human interaction, this is an additional cost factor in scaling 
service. 
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facilities provider in one area to own a SIP in an area in which the local provider does not 
provide local facilities.  Similarly, a wide-area network service provider could own a SIP 
as long as that SIP is not connected directly to other SIPs using  the wide-area network 
service provider's facilities.  
 
Competing, independently owned SIPs would effectively define the product and the value 
proposition for local facilities builders.  The product for local facilities builders would be 
connectivity from end users to SIPs; thus this connectivity could be defined in terms of 
the types of attributes currently used to define end-to-end connectivity for leased lines.  
Competition among SIPs would allow the value of wide-area services to be transmitted to 
agents considering investments in local facilities.  The higher the value to end users of the 
wide-area services, the greater the amount SIPs would be willing to pay local facilities 
investors to connect end users to the SIP.  By helping to define a local product and value 
proposition for connectivity, SIPs would foster investment in local facilities. 
 
Enabling localization of investment in communications facilities played a key role in the 
development of rural telephony in the U.S.  Managers of the Bell System, which held 
Alexander Graham Bell’s original telephone patents, believed that telephone service was 
primarily of value to business users in major cities.  In 1894, after seventeen years of 
commercial activity, the Bell System had installed nearly 90% of its phones for business 
subscribers.36  Independent, locally financed commercial telephone companies, 
community-oriented mutual companies, and farmer cooperatives brought telephony to 
small agricultural cities and rural areas.37  By 1920, 38.7% of American farms had 
telephone service, while only 30% of American households did.38  Telephone service 
expanded to cover all of the U.S. under historical conditions that fostered decentralized 
investment in local access facilities.39  The geographic structure of local exchanges that 
was established prior to 1917 still essentially defines the geographic structure for current 
U.S. interconnection regulation.40   A set of competing, independently owned SIPs could 
recreate incentives for decentralized investment in local access facilities. 
 
SIPs would also facilitate low-cost wide-area bandwidth transactions.  Some industry 
participants foresee commodity markets emerging for bandwidth.41  Such markets could 
help provide appropriate signals for wide-area network investment and lessen the cost of 
                                                 
36 Mueller, Milton, Universal Service; Competition, Interconnection, and Monopoly in the Making of the 
American Telephone System (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997) p. 40. 
37 Ibid, Chapter 6. 
38 Ibid, p. 148. 
39 Ibid, Chapter 12. 
40 In 1917 there were 19,550 local exchange offices in the U.S.  Ibid, p. 147.  In 1998, local exchange 
carriers reported a total of 18,700 local exchange switches to the FCC (1998 Statistics of Common Carriers, 
Table 2.10).  The Oct. 1999 LERG lists 22,860 distinct office codes for incumbent local exchange carriers, 
of which about 4300 appear to be multiple references to listed U S West offices.  
41 Enron has made the most extensive public proposal to data.  See www.enron.net/bandwidth/.   
Companies active in bandwidth brokerage and trading include Arbinet (www.arbinet.com), Band-X 
(www.band-x.com) and RateXchange (www.ratexchange.com). 
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rolling out new wide-area services.42  The development of such a market will depend on 
establishing a widely recognized set of nodes among which bandwidth can be traded.  
SIPs could serve effectively as nodes for a bandwidth market. 
 
A well-developed layer of competing SIPs would provide a lattice upon which new wide-
area network-services could be implemented.  The largest share of value in wide-area 
networks is likely to be associated with non-commoditized characteristics such as 
interconnection services, physical circuit diversity and reliability, and pricing and 
protocol options.43  By providing a lattice for implementing such services, SIPs would 
eliminate the need among competing wide-area networks for a new mode of 
interconnection in order to provide a new service ubiquitously.  Such a lattice would 
lessen the importance of various forms of peering among wide-area networks and hence 
decrease industry tensions associated with Internet interconnection. 
 
C. Recent Industry Developments and Institutional Possibilities 
 
SIP-like institutions are already beginning to emerge in the communications industry.  
One is PAIX, which began operating in 1996 as a center in California for exchanging 
traffic among ISPs.44  PAIX states that it is carrier-neutral, not owned by a telco or 
carrier, and not affiliated with any ISP.  PAIX has announced plans to open six additional 
highly secure facilities for collocation and interconnection among ISPs in the U.S. within 
a year.45  Another company offering SIP-like institutions is Equinix, founded in 1998.  
Equinix builds and operates carrier-neutral and content-provider-neutral facilities it calls 
“Internet Business Exchanges”.46  Equinix offers for network facilities providers, content 
providers, and applications service providers a set of buildings with financial grade 
security, redundant power supplies, private and shared collocation areas, and a wide 
range of options for interconnecting within the building.  Equinix currently has one 
IBX operational in the Washington, D.C. area and recently signed a $1.2 billion 
contract for constructing more than 30 additional IBXs in business, financial, and 
Internet hubs around the world.47   
 
                                                 
42 The development of such a market should not be taken for granted.  Attempts to establish commodity 
markets have historically had a high failure rate even among products with propitious characteristics.  See 
Black, D.G., Success and Failure of Futures Contracts: Theory and Empirical Evidence (New York, 1986). 
43 Historically the heterogeneity of user needs spurred the development of private networks. See Gable, 
David, “Private Telecommunications Networks: An Historical Perspective,” in Public Networks, Public 
Objectives, ed. Eli Noam and Aine Nishuilleabhain (Elsevier Science, 1996), pp. 35-49, draft available on 
the web at  www.vii.org/papers/citi509.htm. 
44 All subsequent information about PAIX is from press releases on PAIX’s website, www.paix.net.  The 
PAIX center in Palo Alto, CA, was set up by Digital Equipment Corportion.  Currently it is a subsidiary of 
Metropolitan Fiber Network, a seller of dark fiber connectivity. 
45 The locations for the facilities are Tyson’s Corner, VA; Atlanta, GA; Dallas, TX; Los Angelos, CA, and 
an additional facility in Palo Alto, CA. 
46 Unless otherwise noted, the information on Equinix given here is from Equinix’s website, 
www.equinix.com. 
47 According to CNET News, in May 1999, the CEO of Equinix, Al Avery, indicated that Equinix planned 
to build 15 IBXs domestically.  See Heskitt, Ben, “Start-up aims to house Net data exchanges”, CNET 
News.com, May 25, 1999. 
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Some real estate companies are beginning to provide SIP-like institutions.  The Rudin 
Family, developers and owners of one of New York’s largest privately owned 
commercial and residential real estate portfolios, is a prime example.48  The Rudin 
Family developed and owns the New York Information Technology Center at 55 Broad 
St., Manhattan, which houses a large number of communications and new-media 
companies.  The Rudin Family has established similar facilities at 110 Wall St. and at the 
former Grumman Aircraft factory on Long Island.  The Rudin Family recently bought 
from AT&T a former AT&T long lines switching center at 32 Avenue of the Americas.  
The building will be renovated  and called the New York Global Connectivity Center.  It 
will house network transport providers, web-hosting companies, Internet companies, and 
switch companies, and it will provide extensive support for in-building interconnectivity.   
 
Most of the SIP-like institutions described above are located in major cities and do not 
provide services to end users.  In residential and rural areas, ISPs moving to offer their 
end users a variety of network services may evolve into SIPs.   Dial-up Internet 
connectivity has become for ISPs a low-margin, commodity service that cannot sustain 
their businesses.  ISPs are thus seeking to develop value-added businesses such as web 
hosting, video-conferencing, e-commerce, and variety of other wide-area network 
services.  An impediment to ISPs ability to offer their customers new services is the lack 
of competition in local telephony in residential and rural areas.   However, as ISPs 
assemble increasingly appealing offerings of network services, they will generate strong 
incentives for the entry of local facilities providers who can connect end users to these 
services.   Given that numerous ISPs provide local service in almost all regions of the 
U.S.49, they could be important to the development of competing, independently owned 
SIPs that cover all of the U.S. 
 
 
IV.  A Feasible Policy Lever for Improving Industry Structure 
 
Changes in voice telephony regulation to promote the development of SIPs could help 
overcome the structural weaknesses that are appearing in Internet and telephony 
competition.   In particular, voice telephony regulation could seek to establish a 
geographically comprehensive lattice of competing, independently owned certified SIPs.  
Becoming a certified SIP would involve gaining a privileged position for voice telephony 
call termination in exchange for adhering to certain ownership restrictions.  All telephony 
service providers in defined SIP regions would be required by regulation to provide zero-
                                                 
48 The subsequent information is from press releases at www.55broadst.com and Branson, Ken, “AT&T 
Sells Former Long Lines Building for Telco Hotel”, Phone+, 12/16/1999 (www.phoneplusmag.com).  SIP-
like institutions are generally called “telco hotels” in the trade press.  For discussions of telco hotels, see 
Branson, Ken, “No Vacancy, Telco Hotels Can’t Go Up Fast Enough”, X-Change Magazine, 4/1999 
(www.x-changemag.com); Marshall, Jonathan, “Telco Hotels Fill Up Fast”, San Francisco Chronicle, July 
2, 1998, reprinted on the web at www.boradlink.com/press/colomotion.html.  Other non-telecom 
companies that offer or own colocation services include Colomotion (www.colomotion.com), Hudson 
Telegraph Associates, Switch and Data Facilities Corp. (www.switchfacilities.com),  Taconic Investors, 
Telecom Real Estate Service, and  Telehouse (www.telehouse.com).  
49 See Greenstein, Shane, “Universal Service in the Digital Age: The Commercialization and Geogrpaphy 
of U.S. Internet Access,” NBER Working Paper No. W6453 (March 1998), available at www.nber.org. 
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price call (circuit-switched voice, fax, and dial-up modem) termination for calls delivered 
to chosen certified SIPs in the SIP region associated with the called customer.   The 
owner of a certified SIP would not be allowed to own facilities for local connectivity in 
the area in which the certified SIP is located.  A certified SIP would also not be allowed 
to own network facilities connecting to other certified SIPs. 
 
Further necessary decisions about certified SIPs would depend on institutional 
circumstances.  One issue is the geographic areas associated with SIPs’ voice termination 
roles and transport facility ownership restrictions.  In the U.S., a natural choice is 
LATAs.   Each state regulatory commission might certify, for a fixed term of 5 years, 3-5 
independently owned SIPs in each LATA in the state, with all local telephony operators 
in the state having responsibility to terminate calls from at least two of those SIPs.  Since 
there are 236 LATAs covering the U.S., such a program would lead to roughly 750-1000 
certified SIPs spread throughout the U.S.   If all voice traffic, including local calls, passed 
through these SIPs, they would have to support 1.9-2.5 Gbps of voice traffic.50  This is 
about the volume of peak data bandwidth through a major U.S. Internet interconnection 
point in late October, 1999.51 
 
There is a range of institutional possibilities for facilities and ownership of SIPs. 
Independently owned Internet or private network interconnection points might be 
candidates to be certified SIPs.  Highly capable ISPs meeting the transport facility 
ownership restrictions might also be candidates to be certified SIPs.   National network 
operators, many of whom are building large data centers, might be willing to divest 
transport facilities to some data centers in order to make them candidates to be certified 
SIPs.52  In addition, regulators or antitrust authorities could consider requiring large 
incumbent LECs to divest some tandem switching offices so as to create an 
interconnection structure more conducive to controlling incumbent LEC market power.53 
 
A. Considerations of policy feasibility 
 
Changing voice telephony regulation is a much more propitious policy direction for 
influencing evolving industry structure than is establishing new regulations for Internet 
peering.  Large incumbent LECs are widely recognized  to have market power in 
providing local telephony.  In contrast, market structures for Internet services are highly 
dynamic, and market power arguments with respect to Internet services typically depend 
significantly on speculation about future developments.   Moreover, while there is 
widespread, deeply rooted hostility toward changing the regulatory framework for 
Internet services, telephony regulation over time has gone through a series a major new 
regulatory initiatives.  Associated with that history is the FCC’s extensive knowledge and 
                                                 
50 Calculation based on total voice bandwidth given in Table 1.  Voice calls among incumbent telephony 
customers would not necessarily pass across SIPs. 
51 Based on bandwidth for MAE East.  See 208.234.102.97/MAE/east.aggr.overlay.html. 
52 AT&T, UUNet, PSINet, Qwest, and Intel are talking about building about 25 new data centers each this 
year.  See Gerwig, Kate, “Salving Future Services”, tele.com, 1/10/2000 (at www.teledotcom.com).  Level 
3 has also built more than 25 data centers that offer a wide range of services to collocating customers. 
53 Large incumbent LECs might, in fact, find it advantageous, from the perspective of transforming industry 
structure and maximizing asset value, to do this. 
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experience with implementing telephony regulation.  There is no similar knowledge and 
experience with respect to regulating Internet interconnection.  In addition, there is 
significant dissatisfaction with the current state of telephony regulation, and the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 gives the FCC broad forbearance authority with respect 
to almost all of its regulations.   Changes in voice telephony regulation that promote SIPs 
could be accompanied with a dramatic reduction in a wide range of other regulations that 
would no longer be part of this new implementation of a pro-competitive, deregulatory 
national policy framework for the industry. 
 
While data traffic is growing much more rapidly than voice traffic, the value and 
magnitude of voice traffic is still sufficient to influence strongly the over-all structure of 
network interconnection.  The first data column of Table 1 shows total RBOC inter-office 
bandwidth in use.  Subsequent data columns show the total bandwidth required for 
RBOC originated voice calls in different categories.   Assuming that all local voice traffic 
travels between RBOC local exchanges, the total bandwidth of RBOC interoffice 
facilities in use for non-voice services in 1998 was 2.4 times greater than bandwidth 
needed for voice services.  Most of the non-voice bandwidth is for leased line services, 
whose bandwidth has been growing about 40% per year since 1989.54  Internet bandwidth 
in mid-1998 was probably about 110Gbps and it is growing about 100% per year.55  The 
most important point to take from Table 1 is that voice services still account for an 
important share of network bandwidth, although within a few years voice bandwidth will 
be insignificant.56 This means that becoming a distinguished interconnection point for 
voice telephone can play an important role in giving an interconnection point industry 
salience. 
                                                 
54 Despite the significant growth of private networks, there has been relatively little analysis of them.  
Dunn, Donald A. and M. Gens Johnson, “Demand for Data Communication,”  IEEE Network (May, 1989), 
p. 8-12,  provides an informed perspective late in the 1980’s.  Dunn and Johnson foresaw the wide-area 
interconnection of computer networks that created the Internet.  They estimated that data revenue was 
growing 23% per year in 1988, and anticipated that data revenue would account for more than half of 
common carrier revenues in 1997.  In 1997, according to the FCC SOCC Table 2.9, data revenue accounted 
for about 6% of local exchange carriers common carrier revenue.  Based on data in AT&T’s 1998 Annual 
Report, I estimate that about 20% of AT&T’s revenue is data revenue. 
55 Coffman, K.G, and A.M. Odlyzko, “The size and growth rate of the Internet,” (available on the web at 
www.research.att.com/~amo) estimated the effective bandwidth of the Internet core at 75Gbps at year-end 
1997.   They also estimate that, with the exception of a spurt in 1995 and 1996, the trend growth rate of 
core Internet bandwidth is 100% per year.  Coffman and Odlyzko estimate U.S. long distance voice 
bandwidth at 350Gbps at year-end 1997.  Since RBOCs account for about 70% of U.S. local access lines, 
the Coffman-Odlyzko long distance voice bandwidth figure is roughly in accord with the interLATA toll 
figures in Table 1 above.  On the other hand, Coffman and Odlyzko’s figure for private line and public data 
networks, 370Gpbs at year-end 1997, appears to be a significant underestimate.  
56 Forbes.com reported that Bing Yang, the chief technology officer and cofounder of Convergent 
Networks, which focuses on voice networks, stated that AT&T’s network carries 850 terabytes of voice 
traffic per day as compared to 33 terabytes of data traffic.  See Malik, Om, “Telecom titans”, Forbes.com, 
9/8/99 (www.forbes.com/tool/html/99/sep/0908/feat.htm).  The specific nature of these measurements is 
unclear.  Nonetheless, it is worth noting that utilization rates for long distance switched voice circuits 
(33%) are almost an order of magnitude greater than utilization rates for data circuits (3-5%).  See Odlyzko, 
Andrew, “The Internet and other networks: Utilization rates and their implications,” (available on the web 
at ww.research.att.com/~amo) AT&T Labs – Research, Sept. 12, 1998.   The inter-office bandwidth data in 
Table 1 refer to the bandwidth of circuits in use, not the volume of traffic passing through those circuits. 
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Table 1 
RBOC Bandwidth in Use 
(in Gbps) 
 
 interoffice 
bandwidth 
interLATA toll intraLATA toll local total 
voice 
1998 6,291 217 54 1,602 1,874 
1997 4,128 221 61 1,540 1,822 
1996 3,376 206 58 1,501 1,766 
1995 2,762 194 66 1,456 1,716 
1994 1,654 172 65 1,396 1,633 
1993 1,304 156 64 1,340 1,560 
1992 934 142 64 1,299 1,505 
1991 729 135 66 1,256 1,457 
1990 493 133 56 1,217 1,407 
1989 346 157 55 1,174 1,386 
Notes: Interoffice bandwidth calculated based on data in RBOC price cap annual filings.  Telephony 
bandwidth based on FCC SOCC call volumes, estimated call times, and 9000 minutes/month/per 64 Kbps 
circuit.  
 
 
B. Some consideration of costs and benefits57 
 
A requirement that all local telephony providers in a defined geographic area provide 
zero-price call termination from at least two certified SIPs in the area has relatively small 
costs and large benefits.  This requirement promotes the concentration of network traffic 
at certified SIPs and thus helps to promote SIPs’ industry significance in future network 
development.  This requirement also provides an administratively simple telephony 
interconnection regime that would allow network operators to provide flat-rated 
telephone service.  It would eliminate huge battles such as those that have occurred in the 
U.S. over reciprocal compensation for switched circuit minutes associated with dial-up 
Internet connections.   
 
Competition in local telephony by itself will shift more voice traffic into inter-office 
networks.  Traditionally, local exchange offices were designed around local calling 
communities so that local calls could be completed without the need for inter-office 
transport.  When neighbors are connected to competing local telephone companies, local 
calls require inter-office transport.58  As the figures in Table 1 suggest, because local call 
                                                 
57 For further discussion of questions and objections raised regarding this proposal, see Galbi, Douglas, 
“Transforming Network Interconnection and Transport: Policy Direction Summary,” currently available on 
the Social Science Research Network (www.ssrn.com), forthcoming in info. 
58 To lower their customers’ phone bills for dial-up Internet access, some ISPs have sought to become 
“virtual neighbors” of their customers.  They do this by acquiring a number for each local calling area for 
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volumes are high relative to intraLATA and interLATA toll calling, competitors shifting 
even a small share of an incumbent LEC’s local call bandwidth to inter-office transport 
can result in a large percentage increase in inter-office voice transport.59   
 
In a competitive industry, reducing interconnection management costs is probably more 
important than reducing the demand for inter-office voice transport.   Given the 
magnitude of total inter-office bandwidth, doubling or tripling the amount of inter-office 
voice transport would not require a major re-dimensioning of the over-all network. On 
the other hand, managing interconnection involves exchanging traffic predictions at each 
interconnection point and coordinating the installation and maintenance of new 
interfacing bandwidth.  Such processes are administratively complex, error-prone, and 
not subject to rapid technological improvements like those driving down bandwidth and 
switching costs.  Nonetheless, industry experience thus far shows incumbents often 
seeking to require competitors to interconnect with them at a relatively large number of 
local offices.60  
 
New local telephony providers terminate calls to their customers from relatively few 
publicly advertised offices.  Consider Table 2, which documents some aspects of 
telephony network structure in the greater New York City metro area (LATA 132).  The 
first data column in Table 2 gives the number of rate centers served.  Rate centers are a 
historically determined geographic partition of an area: the number of rate centers served 
is a rough index of the scope of a telephony provider’s coverage.  The second data 
column of Table 2 shows offices advertised in the Local Exchange Routing Guide 
(LERG) as delivery points for calls to the provider’s customers.61  New local telephony 
providers cover a significantly larger number of rate centers per call delivery point than 
does Bell Atlantic.  This suggests that new local telephony providers are not seeking to 
economize on transport costs by having telephony providers deliver calls to them close to 
their end customers. 
 
The time and cost of establishing points of presence is not hindering the ability of new 
local telephony providers to establish more termination points for calls to their customers.   
Through July 1999, Bell Atlantic-NY had provided 750 physical collocation 
                                                                                                                                                 
which they provide dial-up Internet access and having their communications provider terminate all these 
numbers to the same physical point.  One result is that the incumbent operator sees more local call minutes 
traveling through its interconnection trunks. 
59 For a discussion of this problem in Austria, see Merka, Martin, Manfred Nussbaumer, and Ernst-Olay 
Ruhle, “The Influence of Interconnection Demand on Traffic Flows and Network Design for an Incumbent 
Operator – The Austrian Example,” paper presented at the 17’th Annual ICFC Conference, Denver USA, 
June 16, 1999. 
60 Bell Atlantic-New York has asked the NY Public Service Commission (NYPSC) to require that 
interconnecting LECs establish a geographically relevant interconnection point (GRIP) in every rate center 
that the LEC serves, unless the interconnecting carriers negotiate alternative arrangements.  See NYPSC, 
Case 99-C-0529, Opinion No. 99-10 (Aug. 26, 1999), p. 48, 62.  The NYPSC rejected the GRIP proposal.   
61 The LERG is produced by the Traffic Routing Administration (TRA), Telcordia Technologies.  The FCC 
has published LERG data on carriers’ counts of NXX to provide an indication of the development of 
competition.  See Local Competition: August 1999, Industry Analysis Division, Common Carrier Bureau, 
FCC, available on-line at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common_Carrier/Reports/FCC-State_Link/fcc-
link.html. 
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arrangements in 175 central offices.62  Of these collocation arrangements, 137 are in the 
greater New York City area (LATA 132).63  Nonetheless, as Table 2 shows, new 
telephony providers are using only 13 collocations in BA offices in LATA 132 as points 
for collecting calls from other networks.  When such arrangements are used, the larger 
new local telephony providers use exclusively BA tandem offices.  This fact further 
suggests that the geography of interconnection points for terminating voice telephony has 
thus far been determined by the historical location of a relatively few, large incumbent 
offices.  Policy that requires voice telephony call termination from certified SIPs 
represents a dramatic change only in the sense that it shifts voice telephony 
interconnection to a non-adversarial environment, i.e. competing, independently owned 
SIPs. 
 
 
Table 2 
Voice Telephony Delivery Points in LATA 132 
 
 
Local Telephony 
Provider 
Rate 
Centers 
(a) 
Delivery 
Points 
(b) 
Ratio 
(a)/(b) 
Colo’s in 
BA 
Offices 
Colo’s 
in BA 
Tandems  
Bell Atlantic (wireline) 126 167 0.8   
AT&T (wireline) 50 13 3.8 3 3 
MCI WorldCom 32 7 4.6 0 0 
Nextlink 28 1 28.0 0 0 
Allegience 23 5 4.6 3 3 
Cablevision Lightpath 20 7 2.9 0 0 
RCN  20 6 3.3 4 4 
American Network, Inc. 18 1 18.0 0 0 
Frontier 18 5 3.6 4 4 
WinStar 15 1 15.0 0 0 
Level 3 Comm. 15 2 7.5 0 0 
   
all other than BA 83 77 13 6 
Note:  Based on LERG data current for 10/1/99.  AT&T (wireline) consolidates entries for 
ACC National Telecom, AT&T Local, and Teleport.  MCI WorldCom considates entries for 
Brooks Fiber, MCIMetro, and WorldCom. 
 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
Policy analysts and policy makers should consider the merits of different competitive 
structures in the telecommunications industry.  Significant weaknesses in industry 
structure are apparent in the Internet and in the development of local telephony 
competition.  Pro-competitive regulation for voice telephony is not adequately 
                                                 
62 Bell Atlantic-NY Section 271 Application, Lacouture/Troy Declaration, para. 29. 
63 Calculated based on LERG data on LATA’s and wirecenters and BA’s list of offices where collocation 
has been provided.  This list is available on the web at http://www.bellatlantic.com/tis/bacolloc.htm. 
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considering over-all industry structure; instead, it appears to be largely driven by 
particular, narrow requests for pro-competitive interventions.  Nonetheless, voice 
telephony regulation will have an enduring effect on industry structure even when voice 
telephony is a relatively unimportant network service.  Armed with an understanding of 
the challenges confronting both Internet services and voice telephony, such a legacy can 
become a tool for improving industry performance. 
 
 
